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Theresa May’s first two years in office illustrate Anthony King’s (1991) observation that 
premierships can vary within themselves. Her premiership divides into two distinct phases, 
before and after the snap general election of June 2017, with a final coda after July 2017 when 
her premiership unravelled. Whilst the disastrous election looked like the crucial event, 
analysis using the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) suggests that, contrary to popular 
assumptions, before the election May was weaker than she appeared and afterwards not 
quite as diminished as assumed. The LCI analysis we present here (focusing on the year before 
and the year after the 2017 general election) shows that May’s capital fell, but not as far as 
presented by prevailing narratives. May went from being, in LCI terms, an ‘exceptional leader’ 
to a ‘medium capital leader’ facing obstacles, but still capable of action. May’s resilience after 
2017 was a result of Brexit, the poor polling of her opponents and her unexpected poll 
strength, bolstered by the weakness of her internal challengers. Even a poorly positioned 
prime minister has considerable resources to call upon.  
 






This article analysis Theresa May’s changing leadership capital during the first two years of her 
premiership from her arrival in power until the final publication of her ‘Chequers Agreement, her 
proposed solution to Brexit that led to her removal and stepping down a year later. Using the case of 
Theresa May, it examines how a leader gains, loses and conserves authority, and looks at what 
resources even a troubled and weak  prime minister can use or draw upon to stay in office 
 
Prime ministers are often presumed to be powerful. The sheer flexibility of the office of prime 
minister gives it a strong potential towards dominance.  The Westminster system traditionally 
‘rewards highly individualistic, even heroic, masculinity in its leaders’ (Sykes 2016, 176). 
Claims of over-mighty leaders have dogged several leaders since Walpole (in particular 
Thatcher and Blair)  and such claims have increased in volume or been muted, depending on 
the incumbent (Langford 2006). Debate has centred on the extent to which leaders are truly 
dominant or actually constrained (Blick and Jones 2010). Such discussion often leads to a lack 
of nuance, as authority, skills and achievement are shaped by institutional location, relations 
and an incumbent’s operating context (Laing and McCaffrie 2013). In certain situations, a 
leader can bring ‘unity, direction and control’, particularly when ‘political capital and 
governing capacity are combined’ (Weller 2018, 246). Yet they rarely do, and even the 
supposed dominance of long serving leaders such as Blair and Thatcher was episodic and 
temporary (Bennister and Worthy 2017).  
 
The conduct of any prime minister is shaped by a bundle of political or personal assets, though 
they are not always either deployable or helpful (Helms 2017: Owen and Hargrove 2003).  
Given this, the abilities and capabilities of office are, in some senses, merely ‘narrow strategic 
options’ and ‘the prime minister should be conceived of as a strategic actor operating within 
a strategically selective context’ (Byrne and Theakston 2018, 9).  
 
Context further shapes authority. Harold Wilson wrote of the ‘unrealistic assumption that 
everything was static’ for any one prime minister (1977, 23). Prime ministerial power is a 
‘contingent and moveable feast’ shifting between and within premierships (Heffernan 2005, 
615). One study of prime ministers since the 1970s concluded that most leaders, most of the 
time, have been reactive and ‘battered by events’ (Theakston 2013, 234).Premierships 
frequently ‘zig zag’ as successive leaders define themselves against their predecessor (Blick 
and Jones 2010). There is also ‘variety within the life time of a single premiership’, due to 
deliberate action or ‘changed circumstances’ (King 1991, 43). There can be ‘shifts in style 
during particular tenures’ with leaders such as Thatcher and Blair empowered or weakened 
at different points (Blick and Jones 2010, 123). Tony Blair complained that as prime minister 
you ‘begin at your most popular and least capable and end at your least popular and most 
capable’ (Heffernan 2005, 643).  
 
This article will show that May’s first two years in office are a striking example of just how 
much a single premiership can change, as her position went from dominance to defence in 
the space of ten months. Research has demonstrated how and why May became prime 
minister, utilising selectorate analysis (Jeffery et al 2017) and Stark’s theoretical framework 
for choosing leaders (Quinn 2018). This article adds to the existing scholarship, presenting a 
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means of assessing May’s dramatic time in office when she appeared capable of action, utilising 
the concept of leadership capital and applying the leadership capital index to May’s time in 
office between July 2016 and July 2018 (Bennister, ‘t Hart and Worthy 2017). The article 
focuses on phases one and two when she seemed capable of action and initiative.  
 
Leadership capital 
The Leadership Capital framework is used as a means of closely measuring authority over 
time, which captures both skills and context. The concept of leadership capital offers a way 
to understand the ‘credit granted to leaders’ and how it is ‘accumulated, diminished and 
depleted’ (Bennister et al 2017, 4). Rather than simply power, it is an ‘aggregate of authority... 
or a leader’s political resources’ (Bennister et al 2015, 416- 418). It represents the ‘aggregate 
of authority’ that grants or limits a leader’s ‘room for manoeuvre or a ‘warrant to lead’ in a 
particular context (Bennister et al 2017, 3). Weller (2018, 23) has described it as the most 
developed process so far’ for comparative analysis. Decline and diminishing returns are the 
normal trajectory as capital is depleted by defeats, mistakes and scandals. Some politicians, 
however, can rebuild it through electoral (or factional) victories and policy success (Breslauer 
2002; Bennister et al 2017, 3).  
The Leadership Capital Index (LCI) offers a combination of ten quantitative and qualitative 
indicators to evaluate leadership capital built around skills, relations and reputation. This soft 
constructivist approach seeks to capture the interplay between individual abilities, structural 
constraints and contextual conditions (Weller 2018; Burrett 2016). The LCI works best when 
examining single leaders or comparing leadership within single country political systems, and 
it carries the imprint of its Westminster origins (see Brown 2018; Helms 2016; Helms 2017). 
When applied across a wider series of country cases, leaders ‘finding their voice’ was found 
to be important in building capital, whereas a fall in personal or party polling or a sudden 
collapse in trust after a scandal or crisis quickly eroded it (Bennister et al 2017).  
The LCI, developed by Bennister et al (2015, 2017) has been utilised as a comparative 
diagnostic tool for case study research. The concept of leadership capital and the 
operationalisation of the Index have been examined and critiqued by a range of scholars 
(see Weller 2018, Elgie 2015, Helms 2017 and Brown 2018). The Index is intended as a simple 
and parsimonious set of indicators that could both capture the interactive nature of 
leadership and be adapted to different systems. Bennister et al (2017) applied such an 
approach to a range of country cases studies which naturally involved some 
methodological compromises and trade-offs. Some indicators overlap, for instance polling 
ratings and trust, and others remain double-edged as, for example, experience in office can 
bring greater knowledge but also reinforce poor habits.  
As Blondel (2017, 251-254) makes clear, the ten measures of the current LCI were left equally 
balanced for methodological reasons. Bennister et al (2017, 292) explain that there was an 
initial reluctance to include any weighting in the LCI, as it proved too challenging to justify 
which components were to be weighted and to what degree. Such fluidity has allowed the 
Index to be adapted to new case studies. Helms (2017) for example found that 
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communication skills so valued in Anglo-Saxon countries were less important in Germany, 
while Burrett (2016) applied the Index to Japanese leaders, testing its resilience in non-
western contexts.. Similarly, the mixture of hard and soft measures, some static and others 
dynamic, offered different methodological approaches within a single index. Users of the LCI 
were advised to carefully triangulate sources or use valid techniques (such as cross-checks or 
ICR tests) to ensure reliability, especially for the softer measures (Bennister et al 2017, 
14). Case studies on, for instance, Hungary, experimented with large number of data points, 
while an Italian study used expert surveys as a basis for some of the soft measures (Korosenyi 
et al 2017, Grimaldi 2017). The LCI remains a useful analytical tool and especially so in single 
country cases.  
 
Measuring May’s Premiership 2016-2018 
Theresa May’s premiership presents a puzzle for the LCI to solve. Her time in office ran 
through three phases: the first was the dominant phase to June 2017, and the second a phase 
of retreat until the publication of her Chequers. The third phase constituted an‘unravelling’ 
coda when, once May’s project became public, her premiership was undermined by 
resignations, division and continual plots. The article focuses on phase 1 and 2, before May 
lost her room for manoeuvre in phase 3.  
How did May survive in office after such an apparent steep capital loss? Application of the LCI 
suggests that the conventional media narrative was exaggerated: before the election May’s 
capital was weaker than it appeared, and afterwards not quite as diminished as it seemed. 
Appendix 2 summarises the different levels of leadership capital for comparative purposes. 
Her continued survival speaks to the importance of institutional frameworks and contexts in 
protecting incumbents and preserving capital. Even a poorly positioned prime minister has 
considerable resources. May also utilised negative resources, when a ‘constraint’ can be 
‘successfully transformed into a positive resource’ (Helms 2017, 6). 
This article examines May’s capital at a series of six key milestones in the first two years of 
her premiership between July 2016 and July 2018. The study covers the 10 months before 
and 11 months after May’s election, bookended by her arrival in power in 2016, when she set 
to resolve Brexit, and the final publication of her first plan to solve it in 2018.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
For each milestone we gave a score based on quantitative data for the ‘hard’ measures and a 
cross section of qualitative sources for the ‘soft’ (see the table in Appendix 1). For those softer 
sources, a combination of academic analysis and biographies were drawn on. For consistency 
only IPSOS/Mori polling data was used. For variable 7, on trust, the lack of data meant polling 
over the success of the Brexit negotiations was added. The analysis is supported with 
comparison with recent UK prime ministers, to better contextualise May’s actions. In the case 
of May, for example, her political vision and communication skills were mapped through 
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reliable well-evidenced sources, such as biographies, insider accounts and academic studies 
of the general election campaign (see Prince 2017, Shipman 2018, Ward and Wring 2018). 
Similarly, leadership challenge and parliamentary effectiveness drew on reliable accounts and 
academic studies of parliamentary dynamics and legislative agendas (Tierney 2018 and Tonge 
and Evans 2018). 
 
Theresa May 2016-18 
May came to power as a takeover prime minister, inheriting the office through resignation 
rather than election (Worthy 2016). Takeovers lack capital building election wins and must 
often defend ‘past policies’ or ‘solve problems created by previous decisions’, which can drain 
authority and limit their room for manoeuvre (Weller 2018, 41). Recent takeovers such as 
Callaghan, Major and Brown have struggled with this combination of weak legitimacy and 
inherited problems (Worthy 2016). 
May took over during one of the deepest crises of modern times, as the UK faced the 
consequences of its Brexit vote. This meant conducting hugely complex negotiations amid a 
series of rolling constitutional crises (de Mars et al 2018). Brexit deepened demographic and 
social divisions that left the UK ‘polarised in terms of public opinion, [and] destabilised in 
terms of its territorial politics’ (Jennings and Lodge 2018, 1). It appeared the ultimate ‘wicked 
problem’, with the political danger of absorption and failure tied with the policy danger that 
there was no clear solution that didn’t involve potentially disruptive downsides, either 
political or economic (McConnell 2018).   
Initially, May appeared to override these recurrent takeover problems. In her first, apparently 
dominant phase from July 2016 to June 2017 she enjoyed an extended honeymoon, with high 
personal approval ratings and a supportive press (Allen 2018). Though Ma took pains to 
distance herself from her only female predecessor, May followed Thatcher in adopting a 
personalised and presidential style, and pitched herself as an outsider and radical transformer 
(see King 2002: Kenny 2018). Her premiership began with a remaking of offices of state and a 
brutal sacking of her predecessor’s allies (Allen 2017). Allen (2018) argues she could ‘have 
joined the likes of Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher on the list of political weather-
makers’. She chose a powerful, if high risk, strategy of political radicalism with a ‘hard Brexit’ 
that meant leaving the EU, Single Market and Customs Union (McConnell 2018). 
Once in office and faced with implementing Brexit, it was widely assumed that May would 
conserve her leadership capital and she repeatedly committed to stay the length of her 
inherited tenure until 2020 (Allen 2018). Instead, 10 months later she called a sudden snap 
election, and few doubted a landslide (Bale and Webb 2018). Her gamble backfired 
spectacularly as the campaign was undermined by her increasingly poor performance, a 
misconceived strategy and a ‘shallow’ base of support (Mellon et al 2018). Thereafter, May’s 
premiership came to resemble a retreat. May became boxed in by her party and commitment 
to a hard Brexit. On Brexit, her radicalism morphed into a ‘semi-cautious balancing act’ 
(McConnell 2018, 173).  Her constant U-turns, shifts and changes made her appear not only 
to be governing against her own party, but to be contradicting her own commitments and 
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‘governing against herself’ (O’Malley and Murphy 2017, 131). If May’s first year invited 
comparisons with Margaret Thatcher, her second evoked John Major, James Callaghan or, 
most damaging of all, Neville Chamberlain.  
After June 2017, May crossed a series of lines of political failure where her removal seemed 
inevitable. Her skills were in doubt, relations poor and her reputation reduced. She was a 
‘fiasco prime minister’ with her time in office increasing defined by a foreign policy disaster, 
part of a lineage of prime ministers embroiled in external trouble, stretching from Blair to 
Eden and back to Chamberlain (Brummer 2016). Domestically, she lost a parliamentary 
majority against a supposedly unelectable opposition leader, headed a dysfunctional party 
and was found wanting in many of the key facets of modern political leadership. She displayed 
none of the astuteness, statecraft or ‘skills in context’ a prime minister needs to survive 
(Owen and Hargrove 2003). She became a leader with ‘very limited strategic options’ and an 
even more limited lifespan (Byrne and Theakston 2018). Yet she remained in office, and in 
power until far beyond what many predicted. The puzzle is how and why.  
The LCI analysis offers a slightly more nuanced picture than media narratives of strength and 
weakness would have it (see appendix 1 and 2). May in 2016-2017 went from being on the 
edge of an ‘exceptional leader’ to a ‘medium capital leader’, facing obstacles but still capable 
of action. However, May’s highest amount of capital in 2017, at 41, was still lower than Tony 
Blair’s a year and a half into his premiership in 1999 and only just above his in 2003 (Bennister 
and Worthy 2017). After October 2017, her capital then recovered slightly and began to drift 
upwards. Her recovery was, however, a fragile one. While Blair’s capital flowed from his 
communicative abilities, and Thatcher’s from her vision, May’s were based on the poor polling 
of her opponents and her own (surprising) polling resilience (Bennister and Worthy 2017). 
The details of each measure are mapped below. 
 
1. Political/policy vision 
May began with an apparently clear policy vision with Brexit at its centre. She stated 
unequivocally that ‘Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success out of it’ (Quinn 
2018). Beyond Brexit, May-ism, a term May rejected, was a ‘mixture of social mobility and 
industrial relaunch’ that sat uneasily with ‘more socially conservative’ plans (Gamble 2017, 
50). May’s ideology was balanced by her reputation for pragmatism (Prince 2017).  
May was the second female prime minister of the UK and, like Thatcher, her pitch was as a 
woman and self-styled outsider taking on the ‘establishment’, encapsulated by her promise 
to ‘fight against burning injustice’ and govern ‘for the many’ (Allen 2018). In her October 2016 
conference speech May publicly criticised the ‘liberal elite’ and ‘citizens of nowhere’ (Heath 
and Goodwin 2017, 3). She was the ‘Vicar’s daughter’, offering a moral, upright, middle class 
persona, imbued with the idea of ‘public service’, reminiscent of Gordon Brown’s ‘Son of the 
Manse’ or Thatcher’s ‘Grocer’s daughter’ (Smith 2008; King 2002). In the aftermath of the EU 
referendum, she was also the most prominent sign of how women, ‘excluded from 
referendum’, were then made ‘visible as actors in Brexit...to clean-up the mess left by their 
male counterparts’ (Hozić and True 2017, 270; Guerrina et al 2018). Sitting, somewhat 
uneasily, with this outsider style May emphasised her competence, having run the Home 
Office for 6 years, where she had developed an ‘authoritarian persona’ (Allen 2018a). Being 
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branded a ‘bloody difficult woman’ in the party leadership campaign helped shape 
perceptions of her abilities (Allen 2018; Prince 2017).  
 
However, having been a rather reluctant remainer (albeit with a minimal public profile during 
the referendum campaign), she overrode any initial  pragmatism when she called for a hard 
Brexit in October 2016 at her party conference and triggered article 50 in March 2017. These 
actions, intended to offer a radical solution and reassure Leave MPs, proved divisive. They 
were also miscalculations, as they pushed Remain voters towards Labour, while failing to 
build the winning coalition of Leavers she needed to prevail (Prosser et al 2017; Gamble 2018).  
 
After June 2017, the core of May’s vision and strategy came apart and she lacked any sort of 
‘tangible or credible storyline’ required to bolster leadership capital (Bennister et al 2017, 
284). Retreat and constructive ambiguity were used to hold together her party and 
government. Her later compromises on the Northern Ireland backstop in December 2017 and 
the Chequer’s Agreement in July 2018 hinted at a softer Brexit (de Mars et al 2018). 
Government policy ‘changed almost daily. It had to – Brexit can mean anything, and must 
keep as many factions as possible happy’ (de Mars et al 2018, 21). By July 2018, no one was 
sure what May’s vision of Brexit was, even after her Chequers plan was published. Elsewhere 
radicalism gave way to pragmatism, if not inaction, with domestic policies dropped or diluted 
(Cowley and Kavanagh 2018). However, May was far from a visionary leader of the likes of 
Thatcher or Blair (King 2002). May had little vision beyond narrow and incremental policy 
shifts, hemmed in by the imperative of reaching a Brexit deal. May’s reputation for 
pragmatism in fact counted against any visionary approach to enable supporters and the 
electorate to see beyond the constraints of Brexit.  
 
2. Communicative performance 
More than most, May’s was a rhetorical premiership, where speech-making became a key 
guide to her often opaque plans, especially on Brexit, where they were poured over for clues 
(Toye 2011; Grube 2012). Her set piece speeches, at conferences and famously at Lancaster 
house and then in Florence, were aimed at very different domestic and European audiences. 
The need to speak to different audiences simultaneously ‘makes it makes it very difficult for 
leaders to be utterly forthright’ (Kane and Patapan 2012, 50). The polarisation of Brexit made 
May’s difficulty particularly acute, and one she was ill-suited to solve.  
May had always been seen as a poor communicator. As Home Secretary and Prime Minister 
her ‘submarine strategy’ relied on occasional set-piece and heavily controlled media 
appearances (Shipman 2017). Her key Lancaster House speech, heavily trailed as a turning 
point, underwhelmed and revealed little new. Similarly, in her appearances at the House of 
Commons Liaison Committee May had ‘mastered the art of saying nothing’ (Balls 2017).  
Nor was she any better at the softer side of being a ‘good politician’ (Clarke et al 2018). May’s 
limitations were revealed in the snap election campaign, symbolised by her lecturing of a 
nurse that there was no ‘magic money tree’ (Ward and Wring 2017, 205). Her one-to-one 
interviews increasingly backfired due to her wooden delivery and tendency towards 
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repetition. The Guardian’s John Crace likened May to a robot, the ‘Maybot’, a comparison 
that ‘encapsulated her awkward, disengaged manner’ (2017). As a woman, May also failed to 
find the (perhaps impossible) blend of masculinity and femininity needed, instead revealing 
seemingly old fashioned views about ‘boys’ and girls’’ jobs (Kenny 2018). Just as with 
Thatcher, her supposed image of ‘self-confidence’ gave way to a perception of ‘intolerance, 
inflexibility and moralism’ (Gardner 2011, 238).   
After 2017, the previously supportive media spread rumours of her ‘weakness’, even speaking 
of her ‘weeping’ at moments of failure (Kenny 2018). The nadir came in her disastrous speech 
to conference in October 2017, when she was undermined by her own continuous coughing, 
a malfunctioning backdrop, and a prankster’s stage invasion. This was despite a second, more 
successful, Brexit speech in Florence the month before that helped to re-start the stalled 
negotiations.  
Communicative performance is often the key to successful capital building (Bennister et al 
2017; Grube 2012). However, May’s political strengths lay not with high rhetorical power (as 
with Tony Blair), but being the ‘sensible, normal sounding voice of middle England’ and so she 
was somewhat insulated from her poor skills (Prince 2017). 
 
3. Personal poll rating relative to opposition (leader) 
Almost all prime ministers lose popularity and ‘the trend is inexorably downward’ (Denver 
and Garnett 2012, 71). Most leaders have had mostly negative ratings at the end of their 
tenure. As table 2 shows, May’s arc of popularity was exceptional; beginning unusually high, 
her polling then went into a deep and steep decline. The closest modern comparator was 
Gordon Brown, who went from positive to deep minuses in the last few months of 2007 (Wells 
2016).  
May’s initial polling boost as prime minister far outstripped other takeovers and was utilised 
to spearhead the 2017 election campaign (Ward and Wring 2017, 204). Her lead over Corbyn 
was huge in October 2016, when she committed to a ‘hard Brexit’ and triggered article 50. 
However, her mantra of ‘strong (and) stable leadership in the national interest’ was 
undermined by a poorly thought out manifesto, culminating in her ‘U-turn’ over the so-called 
‘dementia tax’ , when she promised  a radical reform of social care and then reneged on it 
(Bale and Webb 2017).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Crucially, in the aftermath of the election, two patterns stabilised a dangerous situation. First, 
amid her own collapse the ‘Corbyn bounce’ was not sustained, while, second, May’s own 
rating moved upwards slightly back to a relatively ‘normal’ negative score. Only in July 2018, 
as the Chequer’s agreement collapsed and both Boris Johnson and David Davis resigned, did 
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May’s approval drop again. Nevertheless, only much later, in March of 2019, did her ratings 
fall far below the average negative.  
 
4. Longevity: time in office 
Time in office can bring vital experience or reinforce poor behaviour (Bennister et al 2017). It 
can hone a leader’s skills or induce delusions of grandeur and a bunker mentality (Heffernan 
2005). Time can also bring achievement and Theakston (2013, 230) points to the ‘correlation 
between tenure in office and prime-ministerial rankings...greatness and longevity in office 
usually go hand in hand’. Furthermore, Theakston and Gill (2011, 71) concluded that ‘six years 
in office...seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for having an impact ’.  
Like other takeovers, May inhabited the same department for too long, and found it difficult 
to adapt or break habits (Helms 2018). She continued her secretive style of working, 
governing through a close, and closed, group of advisors, her ‘Chiefs’, Nick Timothy and Fiona 
Hill (Shipman 2017). After 2017, they were replaced with a new close knit group and a series 
of de facto-deputies. Even in July 2018, MPs continued to complain of May’s ‘bunker 
mentality’ and habit of ‘disregarding input from those outside her inner circle’ (Dickson and 
Cooper 2018). Though all leaders tend to ‘drift’ towards isolation, context is crucial in shaping 
how much of a problem this becomes with their party. 
But there were other signs of May learning. After June 2017, whether by choice or pressure, 
she appeared to learn some delegation and dexterity. She moved to quell instability by, for 
example, meeting with party factions to give them personal assurances, making speeches that 
temporarily squared circles, or retrospectively announcing collective responsibility had been 
(secretly) suspended. This meant May stayed in office amid great instability. Between June 
2017 and July 2018. May lost 1 major minister every four months, and ended her two years 
with the loss of both the Foreign Secretary and Brexit Secretary.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
May had developed enough skills and cultivated sufficient loyalty to survive a series of 
outright rebellions and the virtual collapse of cabinet government.  May’s time in office 
appears paradoxical, as she gained in experience yet remained tethered to modes of 
behaviour that limited her room for manoeuvre.  
 
5. (Re-)election margin for the party leadership 
May’s exact route to the leadership was unusual. No other takeover leader in the last century 
had arrived in Downing Street directly from the Home Office (Worthy 2016). Her mandate, as 
with Gordon Brown’s in 2007, was based on an internal party leadership among MPs. May’s 
win was down to her reputation as a ‘safe pair of hands’ and perceived competence (Quinn 
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2019). Her gender played a role in clearing her path, as her final opponent Andrea Leadsom 
stepped down after her controversial remarks over motherhood (Smith 2017). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Yet she took over a deeply divided party, where around 170 Conservative MPs had supported 
Remain and 158 Leave (Lynch and Whitaker 2018). May was herself a ‘somewhat reluctant 
Remainer’ but received the votes of 150 Remainers and only 41 Leavers (Lynch and Whitaker 
2018). As well as Brexit, voting was also influenced by liberal versus conservative issue splits, 
especially on same-sex marriage, a reform that May had led on as Home Secretary (Jeffrey et 
al 2017). In line with leadership elections for governing parties, and in contrast with 
opposition leaders, Quinn (2019) argues it was competence rather than electability that drove 
May’s victory.  
May’s ‘lopsided’ parliamentary electoral base had two effects. First, like Gordon Brown, May’s 
ascendancy to prime minister meant her electoral skills went ‘untested’ until the snap 
election campaign (Allen 2018: Quinn 2019). Second, it helped determine her actions. Her 
initial hard Brexit strategy was in part aimed at securing the confidence of Leavers. In her 
second post-election phase, her shifting strategy became fraught as divisions became more 
public. By June 2018 the party was badly and publicly divided, with Remainers and Leavers 
split over May’s plans.  
 
6. Party polling relative to most recent election result 
One general measure of leadership success or failure is whether a leader outpolls their own 
party, acting as a net vote winner or loser. However, the direction or even existence of 
causality between leader and party is unclear (Bartle and Crewe 2002; Clarke et al 2000). Party 
and leader evaluations interact but ‘party leaders approval ratings fluctuate much more 
dramatically than parties’ (Mughan 2015, 16). This is certainly the case with May. Her party’s 
ratings rose, fell and stabilised like May’s, but far less forcefully. From a lead of 9 points from 
the 2015 Conservative election victory, the party went from +18 in October 2016 to -2 by 
October 2017 before drifting slowly upwards to +1 by March 2018.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The Conservative polling resilience in 2017-2018 could have been due to the confusion of the 
UK’s EU exit, polarisation of voting intentions or indeed Labour’s tacit support for May’s Brexit 
policy. Whatever the cause, the Conservative party’s polling stability acted as a shield for May 




7. Levels of public trust in leader 
In the UK, ‘evaluations of the Prime Minister...provide a powerful and easily used heuristic for 
determining if the government can be trusted’ (Whiteley et al 2016, 238). Yet the UK is a low 
trust country, with a long term decline, punctuated by shifts around elections (Whiteley et al 
2016). Trustworthiness was a strong part of May’s appeal. May had long cultivated a 
reputation for blunt truth telling. In 2002 she warned her party it was perceived as a ‘nasty’ 
party, an act that helped portray May as a moderniser and a ‘sincere’ politician (Prince 2017). 
Her initial pitch as a ‘safe pair of hands’ and ‘moral leader’ was also based on trust (Wincott 
2017 686).  
However, from the limited trust data available, May had lost rather than gained trust 
compared with her predecessor. Under May’s leadership 19% of the public in March 2017 
and 17% in October 2017 felt ‘leading Conservative politicians’ told the truth most of the time, 
compared to a slightly better 24 % in July 2015 and 22% October 2015 under David Cameron 
(YouGov 2017). Her calling of a snap election after repeated promises not to itself ‘neutered 
her potential assets of reliability and trustworthiness’ (Tonge et al 2018, 3).  
May’s premiership, and confidence in it, was inextricably linked to Brexit. Prime ministers 
often shy away from ‘personalised’ policy initiatives, but May’s ‘Brexit means Brexit’, along 
with Thatcher and the Poll Tax, or Blair over Northern Ireland and Iraq, are high profile 
exceptions (Kavanagh and Seldon 1999). The tracking of public confidence in the negotiations 
underscores May’s personal failure (Stoker and Jennings 2017). In November 2016 a quarter 
of those polled felt negotiations were going ‘well’ or ‘fairly well’ with 46% believing it was 
going ‘fairly’ or ‘very badly’. By July 2018, two-thirds felt negotiations were going badly or 
very badly with only 18 % believing it was going well. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
After June 2017, May was an untrusted prime minister in an untrustworthy context, failing on 
her central mission. 
 
8. Likelihood of credible leadership challenge within next 6 months 
In the UK, outright ‘deposition’ of prime ministers is relatively rare, with Margaret Thatcher 
and Lloyd George isolated examples (Longford 2006: Quinn 2005). Party rules meant May 
could not face an outright challenge but only a confidence vote triggered by 48 letters to the 
1922 committee (which she later did). There could be no ‘stalking horse’, and rivals could only 
‘fulminate’ and destabilise her (King 1991, 29; Weller 2018).  
One trigger for challenge and rivalry is removal, so prime ministerial appointment power is 
usually used carefully, with an eye to competitors, threats and party balance (King and Allen 
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2010). May initially ran against this tendency, sacking a swathe of her predecessor’s 
colleagues, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne (Allen 2017). The 
move demonstrated simultaneously ‘her acceptance of the Brexit referendum result, 
signalled a clear break with Cameron and served to consolidate her power base’ (Allen 2017, 
633). May also appointed her chief rival, Boris Johnson, to the Foreign Office, in a canny move 
intended to trap him into collective and individual responsibility (Allen 2018).  May was also 
careful to balance Leave and Remainer ministers, appointing a trio of Leavers to head up the 
key ‘Brexit’ departments.  
After the election, May was forced to sack her two ‘Chiefs’, Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy as 
MPs pointed the finger at her team in Number 10. Though stabilised by a new Chief of Staff 
Gavin Barwell, Cabinet factions leaked and counter-leaked while Boris Johnson made a series 
of overt attempts to control policy, if not directly oust May (Shipman 2017). Her re-shuffle of 
January 2018, spun as a major change, fell apart when key ministers refused to move and her 
claims in 2016 to promote more women also fell apart as they hit the ‘concrete ceiling’ of 
female representation (Smith 2018). Despite the dysfunction and rebellion, she was not 
forced, like Major, to fight and win a leadership election (Bennister and Heppell 2015). 
Nevertheless, like her predecessors, she appeared trapped ‘in a downward spiral of bad 
publicity...and continued leadership speculation’ (Norton and Cowley 1999, 61).  
May was lucky in her internal opponents. Any ‘serious challengers’ must be senior, 
contenders and have a stock of parliamentary backing (Weller 2018, 44). While Johnson was 
a senior politician, his role in Brexit, his fading public popularity and perceived unreliability as 
Foreign Secretary undermined his support. This only changed once he resigned and became 
a far more potent challenge again in early 2019 managing to marshal Brexiteer forces in his 
favour, and going on to replace May in July 2019. Five months after the Chequers Agreement 
May did, in fact, face a formal attempt to remove her in December 2018, which she survived. 
The later vote demonstrated how the size of factions within the party precluded her removal; 
the hard Brexit group was large enough to trigger a party no confidence vote but too small to 
win one. Brexit, fear of the disruption and an unreliable successor helped keep her in place. 
Only in May 2019 did she finally agree to a departure date. Like Thatcher, it was finally a 
combination of backbench unease, expressed through the 1922 committee, and the men (and 
some women) in grey suits in Cabinet who ousted her, under the shadow of a resurgent Boris 
Johnson. 
 
9. Perceived ability to shape party’s policy platform 
Before June 2017, May championed a series of strongly personalised policies, including her 
industrial strategy and the creation of a wave of new grammar schools. May also pushed for 
a series of gender based policy reforms, including a radical overhaul of domestic violence law 
and used her office to display her feminist views symbolically, bringing an all-female advisory 
team to meet Donald Trump in January 2017 (Shipman 2017). The snap election campaign led 
to a series of rushed and poorly thought through new policies, including repealing the fox 
hunting ban and a radical reform of social care (Bale and Webb 2018).  
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After June 2017, key policies were dropped, partly because of the pressure on the 
parliamentary timetable and partly because of her supply and confidence agreement with the 
DUP. She had less control but retained some policy initiative, borrowing policy ideas from 
Labour on ending wage freezes and taxing energy companies. Her Home Office reputation 
turned on her, over the issue of police cuts and then the Windrush deportation scandal. Her 
championing of feminism also lost momentum, sitting uneasily with her alliance with the DUP, 
who supported restrictive abortion rights in Northern Ireland, and her close relationship to 
Donald Trump (Kenny 2018). Loss of policy drive was also due to chaotic ministerial turnover: 
May’s priority area of housing had four ministers in two years (Freeguard 2018). 
 
10. Perceived parliamentary effectiveness 
Theresa May, like Callaghan and Major, was forced to spend time with her party and in 
parliament (King 2015). May began with a majority of 17 but inherited an ‘increasingly over 
the shoulder politics’ of backbench rebellion, worsened by her party’s deep splits on Brexit 
(Quinn 2018; King 1992, 231).  
Between July 2016 and June 2017, May’s government was undefeated in the House of 
Commons, in part because little legislation was passed (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018). The 
government did begin the early legal post-referendum periodrelatively smoothly, despite 
predictions of logjams and wrecking, when it navigated the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017 in the space of two months, mainly because Labour voted to support it 
(Allen 2018).  
Yet, any incremental progress was put at risk when May’s snap election left the Conservatives 
without a majority, buoyed only by the 10 votes of the DUP on budget and Brexit votes (Tonge 
2018). Between June 2017 and July 2018 May’s minority government was defeated 13 times 
in the Commons and 30 times in the House of Lords. However, the ‘brute Parliamentary 
arithmetic...has ended up imprisoning her and protecting her at the same time’ (Waugh 
2017). Despite concerns around the DUP’s ‘pivotal position’, their support for Brexit and 
dislike of Corbyn made them a reliable partner (Tonge 2018). 
Conservative backbenchers caused more concern (Tonge 2018). For May, as for Major, the 
problem came less with rebellions themselves, many of which were headed off or reduced, 
but with the perceptions of division and weakness they created (Heppell 2013).The 
government manipulated and bent various rules of parliamentary procedure to mitigate the 
effects of rebellion and opposition, stopping pairing, suspending collective responsibility in 
secret and abstaining on opposition day debates to prevent defeats (Huffington Post 2018). 
The government also ‘under-legislated’ and purposely avoided or dropped controversial 





The LCI analysis tells how May’s leadership capital during the first two years of her 
Premiership did diminish, but not as rapidly or deeply as many narratives would suggest. The 
narrative of ‘dominance then defensiveness’ hides a more nuanced picture of diminishing 
returns. Her early ascendancy masked her underlying weakness until the snap election 
campaign publicly exposed her leadership faults.  
May’s capital eroded in a particular fashion. Her communicative performance went only from 
average to poor, and her trust, given Brexit, simply flat lined throughout. Other leaders 
suffered in these areas because they dropped so far, so quickly, and so much was riding on 
them (see Bennister et al 2017). In disentangling the effects of personality from context, May 
was buoyed by a wider context of crisis, combined with the resilience of her own polling and 
her internal and external opponents’ weaknesses (Bennister and Worthy 2017). Unlike Blair 
and Thatcher, once she began to lose capital she could not draw on her own personal political 
skills to rise above the chaos. 
Nevertheless, the LCI also shows how a prime minister in extreme trouble can stay in post, 
for a period at least, even if in retreat, when certain fundamentals stay sound. Although 
supporters of May stressed her personal resilience after 2017, the stabilising of May’s capital, 
at a lower level, was in part a result of the unique context she faced. Her falling poll ratings 
settled back into acceptable or average negative territory, while her party’s ratings remained 
surprisingly stable. Corbyn’s lack of a poll bounce further bolstered May’s position. Cutting 
back on policy and legislation, by design or accident, helped head off rebellion and defeat. 
Even her lost majority worked to ‘contain disloyalty’ in key votes (Helms 2017, 9). Removal 
was unappealing, if not dangerous, especially with Johnson the obvious alternative. 
 
The Brexit crisis makes May’s premiership unique and uniquely difficult to assess. It was 
immensely destabilising, but also potentially papered over party and government cracks. 
May’s premiership resembled a US president heading a divided government, and she was able 
to style herself in the ‘permanently heroic’ pose of a ‘principled defender of all that is good, 
fighting an opposition bent on bringing the nation to ruin’, pushing for Brexit against the 
establishment (Bailey 2002, 44). Brexit made May, even more than her predecessors, a 
rhetorical premier and she used her set-piece speeches to cajole, manoeuvre and persuade 
(Toye 2011). 
May’s blend of political weakness (regarding skills) and structural advantage (regarding 
incumbency) seems to have been underlined in the months following the publication of the 
Chequers Agreement. Her apparent solution was defeated three times in parliament in 
margins of historic proportions, and managed to gain a fraught and controversial extension 
(which she had publically committed to avoid). Her position was partly stabilised by vague 
commitments to stand down before the 2022 general election. Yet she remained in post – in 
office but not in power - and fought off a vote of no confidence in December 2018 and an 
attempt to change the rules on party leader removal in April 2019. It was only in May 2019, 
that she agreed, or was forced to agree, to a summer departure date and finally stepped down 




May’s survival can be seen as more luck than skill, based on her opponent’s poor polling and 
framed by the uncertainty and intractable challenge of reconciling factions inside and outside 
the party to a  Brexit compromise. May’s endurance reminds us, however, that even a poorly 
positioned prime minister has considerable resources to call upon, and can survive because 
they are prime minister and no one else is.  
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